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The 2010 Belgian EU Presidency  
and CSDP 
Johan Andries 
Col. Johan Andries, Head of the Presidency 
Task Force of Belgian Defence, takes stock 
of the Presidency. 
The New Framework of the Lisbon 
Treaty: Presidency or Non-Presidency? 
From July until December 2010 Belgium held 
the Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union  for  the  twelfth  time.  Belgium  was  a 
founding member of the European Community 
in 1957 and as time went by it has grown into 
“a driving force behind European integration” 
Consequently once again expectations ran high. 
And this 12
th presidency could certainly not be 
considered as a routine operation. After all, the 
Lisbon  Treaty  was  finally  ratified  in  October 
2009.  This  process  did  not  have  a  smooth 
passage.    The  Treaty  implementation  would 
especially sharply influence the domain of EU 
external  action,  also  including  the  Common 
Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP).    The 
development from the rotating presidency (the 
European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council) 
into  a  permanent  presidency  would 
undoubtedly  reduce  the  Belgian  Presidency’s 
strength and visibility. 
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Already  in  the  preparatory  period  it  rapidly 
appeared  that  Belgium  would  adhere  to  and 
align  with  this  new  reality.    Consequently 
Belgium  decided  that  during  this  transition 
period  its  Presidency  would  support  the 
permanent structures and new authorities. In 
the field of the CSDP Lady Catherine Ashton 
was  appointed  new  EU  High  Representative 
(HR) and permanent president of the Foreign 
Affairs  Council.    As  resigning  Minister  of 
Foreign Affairs Steven Van Ackere stated that 
Belgium would not be a fifth wheel among the 
four  major  Lisbon  powers  (Council, 
Parliament,  Commission,  and  the  High 
Representative)  but  that  it  wanted  to  make 
sure  the  four  wheels  were  travelling  at  the 
same speed in the same direction.  This was no 
sinecure at all.  In addition to her responsibility 
as High Representative – in other words, as 
European Minister of Foreign Affairs – Cathy 
Ashton also acts as European Commissioner 
and Vice-President of the Commission.  But 
during  the  implementation  phase  of  the 
Lisbon  Treaty  that  was  coinciding  with  the 
Belgian Presidency, she could not rely on her 
new  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS) that was still to be set up. 
 
Considering  this  new  reality,  Belgium  has 
definitely  opted  for  a  “Non-Presidency”  in 
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compliance with the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty 
and in full support of Lady Ashton’s initiatives 
and  actions.  To  optimize  coordination  and 
consultation,  a  genuine  “Task  Force”  was 
created  including  Belgian  diplomats  and  the 
High Representative’s assistants.   
 
It is therefore obvious that in the preparatory 
period Belgium would never refer to a Belgian 
“Presidency programme”. The Belgian CSDP-
related  items  resulting  from  a  close 
coordination  between  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Defence,  were  passed  on  to  Ashton’s 
private  office.  The  latter  was  eager  to 
adopt  them  in  order  to  reach  a  more 
decisive,  more  coherent,  efficient  and 
visible CSDP.  These items were used to 
develop  the  various  initiatives  Belgium 
took  during  the  short  period  of  its 
presidency – a presidency in the second 
half  of  the  year  is  indeed  de  facto 
reduced to 4.5 working months. 
 
The  Objectives  of  the  Belgian 
Presidency  
In this transition phase, Belgium firstly wanted 
to  contribute  to  and  in  some  ways,  also 
supervise  the  proper  implementation  of  the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
 
In this respect, the installation process of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) was 
undoubtedly  to  be  considered  as  a  priority.  
The activities implied a lot of inter-institutional 
and  international  sensitive  issues  and  have 
developed throughout the Belgian Presidency. 
The  EEAS  has  been  officially  set  up  in 
compliance  with  the  Council  decisions  of  26 
July and 17 November. From a Defence point 
of view, it was important to avoid the military 
expertise  (especially  the  EU  Military  Staff 
(EUMS)  that  has  finally  been  integrated  into 
the  Service)  being  split  up.  As  to  the  crisis 
management decision-making process , it was, 
on the other hand, important for the military to 
have direct access to the HR. To this end, the 
indispensable guarantees have been created in 
the  meantime,  in  spite  of  the  creation  of  an 
additional  position  referred  to  as  “Managing 
Director”,  who  is  in  charge  of  coordinating 
crisis  management.    At  the  end  of  the 
Presidency,  two  questions  have  remained 
unanswered  so  far:  to  what  extent  is  the 
possibility  envisaged  to  include  military 
expertise  (namely  “military  attachés”)  in  the 
various EU delegations throughout the world?  
How  to  consider  the  future  place  of  the 
European Security and Defence College in the 
EEAS? 
 
The  second  Belgian  item  related  to  the 
execution  of  the  Treaty  was  the  possible 
implementation  of  the  new  instruments 
proposed.  The  reserves  Lady  Ashton’s 
entourage  put  forward  compelled  prudence, 
especially  with  respect  to  the  solidarity  and 
mutual defence clauses.  Belgium (and Defence 
more in particular) considerably invested in the 
examination  of  the  implementation  potential 
of  an  instrument  brought  in  by  the  Lisbon 
Treaty in terms of capabilities, i.e. Permanent 
Structured Cooperation in Defence (PESCO). 
This item will be expanded below. 
 
In addition to the Belgian objectives described 
above, that are typical of this transition phase, 
Belgian Defence and Foreign Affairs obtained 
the green light from the High Representative 
to put a few other CSDP-related items on the 
agenda.  They can be categorized into the three 
classic  themes  of  operations  and  missions, 
partnerships and capability development.  We 
will  explain  them  shortly  below,  but  the 
“In this transition phase, Belgium 
firstly wanted to contribute to and 
in  some  ways,  also  supervise  the 
proper  implementation  of  the 
Lisbon Treaty”   3 
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analysis  hereafter  will  reveal  that  especially 
capabilities  have  created  much  momentum. 
This  can  be  ascribed  to  the  somewhat 
unconventional  but  very  fruitful  informal 
meeting of the EU Ministers of Defence, Mr. 
Pieter De Crem organised in Ghent. 
 
Operations and Missions 
During  the  Belgian  Presidency  there  was  no 
reason  to  start  new  operations.  Current 
operations are essentially managed by the EU 
crisis management structures: Council decisions 
are being prepared at various levels going from 
the  political-strategic  (PSC)  to  the  military-
technical  (EUMS)  level.  In  this  respect  the 
rotating Presidency only acts as a facilitator. 
 
Defence  has  paid  special  attention  to  four 
operations  with  a  military  dimension. 
Both  ATALANTA  ‘s  mandate  (the  maritime 
operation  to  combat  piracy  off  the  coast  of 
Somalia)
1  and  EUSEC’s    (a  Security  Sector 
Reform mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the  Congo)    were  extended  for  another  two 
years  until  2012.  For  the  time  being,  the 
conduct of ALTHEA (the military stabilisation 
mission in the Balkans) is being pursued under 
the “Berlin-plus” arrangements, in addition to a 
non-executive mission, with a reduced order of 
battle indeed. 
 
The  decision  to  possibly  extend  EUTM  (a 
training mission in Uganda that was started in 
May 2010 for the benefit of the Somali security 
forces) will only be made in the spring of this 
year. 
 
Relations with the Partners  
The  search  for  a  better  cooperation  between 
NATO  and  the  EU  was  brought  into  focus. 
For  the  time  being,  the  positive  chemistry 
between Lady Ashton and NATO’s Secretary 
General  Rasmussen  does  not  seem  to  be 
capable  of  removing  the  well-known  political 
obstacles.  That is the reason why many efforts 
were deployed during the Belgian Presidency to 
further develop practical and capability-related 
cooperative projects for implementation in the 
joint theatres of operations. The initiatives that 
have been taken in terms of Medical Support 
and Counter IED within that context have in 
the meantime led to a joint document, to be 
used as a basis for further exploration.   
 
Moreover  Belgium  has  acted  as  a  facilitator 
with initiatives at several levels: a visit of the 
NATO and EU Military Representatives to the 
respective  maritime  operations  ATALANTA 
(EU)  and  OCEAN  SHIELD  (NATO) 
Headquarters  in  Northwood  (UK)  and  the 
hosting  of  a  C-IED  clearance  demonstration 
organised  by  NATO.    But  these  harmless 
initiatives  showed  how  the  political  gap 
between a few countries keeps mortgaging even 
the  most  elementary  form  of  cooperation 
between both organisations. 
 
The High Representative endorsed the Belgian 
ambitions  to  strengthen  the  EU-AU 
partnership.  In this context, the EU Military 
Committee Away-Days were held in Africa.  In 
addition to a visit to the EU Somalia Training 
Mission,  a  working  meeting  with  the  African 
Union Commission in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia) 
was also on the agenda.  Different participants 
considered  this  study  trip  as  a  “de  visu” 
discovery  of  unknown  ground.    A  better 
understanding of the evolution of the African 
Peace and Security structure and an exchange 
of  views  on  conflict  prevention  and  on  the 
preparation of armed forces for peace support 
operations  have  undoubtedly  laid  the  useful 
foundations  for  further  reinforcement  of  the 
African strategic partnership, that will hopefully 
gain impetus thanks to the installation of the 
EEAS. 
 
Capabilities 
A  reliable  CSDP  requires  an  adapted  set  of 
capabilities,  available  and  trained  to  be 
deployed in possible operations and missions. 
From the perspective of the “EU trademark”, 
the comprehensive approach, it is important to 
look  at  the  development  of  these  capabilities   4 
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from a civil-military angle. The European level 
of ambition with regard to security and defence 
does indeed go beyond deploying military power 
in  order  to  maintain  or  restore  peace  and 
security in high-risk areas within the European 
sphere of interest. In that respect it is just logical 
that  the  revision  of  the  Civil  and  Military 
“Headline  Goals  2010”  during  the  Belgian 
Presidency  has  resulted  in  one  comprehensive 
political-strategic document that should serve as 
the  basis  for  exploring  civil-military  synergies 
with regard to capability development. 
 
The Battlegroups (EUBG) 
In  view  of  a  more  coherent  CSDP  the  HR 
thinks it is important to reinforce the EU’s rapid 
intervention  capacity.  This  brings  us  to  the 
domain of the EUBG. Most of the EU member 
states are not in favour of a radical revision of 
the concept. Yet some are disgruntled at the fact 
that since the first Battlegroups have been put 
on standby in 2007 this spear force has not been 
effectively  deployed  until  now.  Furthermore, 
open places on the “Standby Roster” for 2012 
and  2013  have  not  yet  been  filled  in.  This 
alarming  phenomenon  could  undermine  the 
credibility  of  the  concept.  Therefore,  creative 
solutions to this problem are not only urgently 
required, but it is all the more important to start 
reflecting on its true causes. 
A possible deployment of military resources in 
case of natural disasters such as the earthquake 
in  Haiti  in  2010  was  one  of  the  topics  of  a 
Brussels Defence Debate organised by the Belgian 
Presidency.  It  is  clear  how  the  EUBGs  tie  in 
with this. The addition of a civil component to 
these  at  present  military  Battlegroups  has  also 
been  proposed  in  the  recent  Weimar  Paper
2 
and  can  also  be  understood  in  this  context. 
However, the question remains to what extent 
the expansion of deployment possibilities for 
the  Battlegroups  can  overcome  the  main 
obstacle for actual deployment, i.e. the lack of 
political will. 
 
Permanent  Structured  Cooperation 
(PESCO) 
The  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation 
instrument envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty has 
been discussed abundantly the last few years. 
Several acronyms have been used to refer to it, 
but  apparently  “PESCO”  (Permanent 
Structured  Cooperation)  has  now  been 
universally  accepted.  However,  for  the 
moment  there  is  less  consensus  on  the 
contents of this instrument. The texts already 
date from the period in which the first lines of 
a “European Constitution” were put on paper. 
This  was  in  2003,  the  early  years  of  the 
“ESDP” then in full development. Driven by 
the integration objective PESCO would offer 
the opportunity to those countries wishing to 
do  so  to  make  faster  progress  in  the 
development of defence capabilities in a spirit 
of very close cooperation. For reasons that we 
know  it  would  last  until  2009  before  the 
Lisbon Treaty would be ratified.  
 
Due to the intergovernmental nature 
of  the  CSDP  and  the  stagnation  of 
the CSDP dynamic there is not much 
excitement  today  for  the 
implementation  of  this  institutional 
instrument.  Yet  the  Belgian 
Presidency  wanted  to  keep  the 
discussion  going  because  it  is 
convinced  of  PESCO’s  possible  added  value 
and with the HR’s consent it was put high on 
the agenda. In the preparatory months leading 
up  to  the  Presidency  a  thorough  internal 
reflection was conducted resulting in a Belgian 
position  paper  which  was  spontaneously 
subscribed  to  by  both  Hungary  and  Poland. 
“A  reliable  CSDP  requires  an 
adapted set of capabilities, available 
and  trained  to  be  deployed  in 
possible operations and missions”   5 
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On this basis Defence organised a seminar in the 
first  days  of  the  Presidency,  the  purpose  of 
which  mainly  was  to  build  on  the  previous 
reflection  exercise  organised  by  Spain  and  to 
achieve  a  common  understanding  of  PESCO. 
The lack of enthusiasm was soon confirmed: a 
different reading of the outdated protocol texts, 
the  binding  character  of  the  criteria  to  be 
defined,  fear  of  a  two-speed  CSDP  and  an 
aversion  to  an  additional  institutional 
bureaucratic framework currently seem to be the 
main obstacles to a quick implementation. Yet in 
the  months  following  this  seminar  it  would 
become apparent that PESCO and its potential 
remain  implicitly  present  in  the  discussions 
regarding capabilities. 
 
The Ghent Framework 
As  is  customary,  each  rotating  Presidency 
organises  an  Informal  Meeting  for  the  EU 
Ministers  of  Defence,  which  is  always  an 
opportunity  for  political  reflections  on  CSDP. 
However,  the  unclear  transition  period  to  the 
post-Lisbon setup would leave a specific stamp 
on the scenario and proceedings of this Informal 
Meeting  which  would  take  place  in  Ghent  as 
Belgium had already decided in 2009.  
 
Within the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, Baroness 
Catherine  Ashton,  High  Representative,  would 
have  very  much  liked  to  chair  this  Informal 
Meeting. Due to incompatible schedules she had 
to give precedence to the General Assembly of 
the  United  Nations  in  New  York.  This 
concurrence  of  events  gave  rise  to  a  creative 
solution: it was decided to have a very informal 
meeting of limited size, chaired by the Belgian 
Minister of Defence Pieter De Crem. Inspired 
by  a  similar  setting  within  a  NATO  context,
3 
which had produced excellent results, a working 
dinner was organised exclusively for the MODs 
and with only one subject for discussion: How 
can we reconcile the growing demand for EU 
action  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  shortfalls 
concerning  capabilities  and  the  ever  shrinking 
national defence budgets on the other hand? 
 
This format clearly met its purpose. We have 
seldom experienced such a substantive political 
discussion.  First  of  all,  through  a  video 
conference  from  New  York  the  High 
Representative presented her most important 
messages: the importance of pooling and sharing, 
of joint civil-military research, and of the pursuit 
of  more  complementarity  with  NATO.  The 
following debate between the 27 EU MODs 
was both substantial and concrete: the answer 
to  the  reduced  national  defence  budgets  is 
sought  in  accepting  and  creating  more  and 
better forms of cooperation. The then German 
Defence Minister, zu Guttenberg, suggested to 
divide  the  military  capabilities  in  three 
categories: those that are preferably kept at the 
national level, a second category which can be 
considered  for  pooling  and  finally  a  third 
category  which  is  suitable  for  role  and  task 
sharing.  This  last  category  implies  the 
acceptance  of  a  certain  degree  of 
interdependence.  The  European  Defence 
Agency  (EDA)  was  given  explicit  political 
support.  It  is  obvious  that  the  Agency  will 
have to play an important part in the search 
for  new  opportunities  for  multinational 
cooperation and in the coordination of these 
initiatives. Finally, in a plenary session in the 
presence  of  a  NATO  delegation  and  in 
keeping with the message of the HR an appeal 
was made to look for new opportunities for 
capability  cooperation  projects  between  both 
organisations. 
 
The  current  budgetary  situation,  the 
untraditional  setting,  a  thorough  preparation 
with respect to content by everyone involved 
and  a  passionate  chairman  were  the  most 
important  success  factors  of  this  Informal 
Meeting,  the  outcome  of  which  has  been 
referred to as “the Ghent Framework”. 
 
On 9 December 2010 the first formal Foreign 
Affairs Council for MODs
4 took place. During 
this meeting, chaired by HR Ashton, not only 
formal Council conclusions were adopted, but 
the reference to “the Ghent framework” was   6 
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also unanimously consolidated. 
 
The Informal MOD meeting and the resulting 
“Ghent  Framework”  created  a  solid  political 
momentum. The challenge for the months and 
years to come will undoubtedly lie in the way in 
which  these  political  intentions  can  be 
transformed into the most appropriate concrete 
forms  of  military  cooperation  between  the 
various  member  states.  To  this  end,  some 
initiatives
5 have already been taken.  
 
Financial benefits, operational added value (with 
among other things increased interoperability by 
bigger standardisation) and avoiding duplications 
should  be  the  objectives.  There  already  are  a 
number  of  cooperation  projects.  Due  to  the 
pressure of shrinking budgets and thanks to the 
recent impulse others will surely follow. Most of 
these “ad hoc” clusters are dictated by financial 
considerations and consist of a limited number 
of participating member states. It is important 
that  these  initiatives  do  not  only  serve  the 
national  interests  of  the  participating  partners, 
but  that  they  also  contribute  to  the  European 
CSDP objectives. In other words, they cannot 
bring about a centrifugal effect. 
 
Therefore it is just as important that those who 
conduct  this  particularly  complex  exercise  are 
clearly identified and recognised. In this respect 
all eyes are on the EDA which is facing a crucial 
period.  In  the  absence  of  tangible  results  and 
deliverables  the  EDA  sceptics  will  undoubtedly 
continue  to  question  the  credibility  of  the 
Agency in the years to come. 
 
However,  the  Military  Committee  also  has  a 
big  responsibility.  Composed  of  the  military 
representatives  of  the  CHODs  this  body  is 
best placed to assess the “military” readiness 
to  cooperation  from  the  various  national 
staffs.  Since  they  are  apprehensive  of  any 
operational  and  structural  consequences  they 
will certainly not be tempted to dive into rash 
adventures. 
 
As  it  turns  out,  PESCO,  the  instrument 
provided in the Lisbon Treaty that has been 
discussed above, needs some time for further 
reflection and maturing. Yet we notice that in 
the  ongoing  discussions  on  cooperation  and 
pooling  and  sharing  PESCO  almost 
automatically  resurfaces.  With  a  view  to 
harmonising  and  supporting  the  numerous 
multinational cooperation initiatives in favour 
of  a  more  efficient  European  capability 
development  PESCO  will  prove  to  be  a 
valuable  tool,  provided  the  Treaty  texts  are 
read in a creative way. 
 
Conclusion  
The  twelfth  Belgian  Presidency  came  at  a 
historic moment. Just between the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty and its entry into 
force  this  Presidency  took  place  in 
difficult  circumstances.  As  the 
rotating  Presidency  was  no  longer 
captain  of  the  ship,  Belgium  thus 
opted for the role of “co-pilot” in this 
transitional phase. The responsibilities 
turned  out  to  be  vague,  the 
coordination with the EU authorities 
was  sometimes  difficult  and  time-
consuming,  but  in  retrospect  the  Belgian 
choice  proved  to  be  the  right  one.  On  the 
basis  of  its  many  years  of  experience,  the 
expertise  of  its  diplomatic  corps  and 
administration,  and  its  organisational  ability 
Belgium  managed  to  be  of  very  valued 
assistance to the High Representative and her 
entourage in this delicate period. Although no 
revolutionary  breakthroughs  with  respect  to 
“As the rotating Presidency was no 
longer captain of the ship, Belgium 
thus opted for the role of ‘co-pilot’ 
in this transitional phase”   7   
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the CSDP have been realised we have ensured 
the continuation of the most important issues to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  member  states.  The 
“Ghent  Framework”  has  given  an  important 
political  impetus  to  a  European  defence 
configuration  which  due  to  an  ever  evolving 
geopolitical  environment  and  because  of  the 
budgetary  reality  will  necessarily  be  based  on 
multinational cooperation models. 
 
While  writing  these  lines  the  effective 
functioning of the EEAS is becoming apparent 
and  the  further  development  of  the  CSDP 
within  this  Service  appears  to  receive  the 
attention that the Member States are looking for. 
The  role  of  the  rotating  Presidencies  will 
inevitably diminish further in favour of the new 
structures.  Yet  I  am  convinced  of  the  added 
value  that  they  will  still  have  as  a  privileged 
discussion  partner  who  can  give  the  necessary 
impetus to avoid that the actual development of 
the  intergovernmental  CSDP  is  curbed  too 
much by institutional bureaucracy.  
   
The building of Europe is a long-term process. 
Whereas Defence is considered by many to be 
an  area  with  potential  for  far-reaching 
integration  this  process  will  undeniably  be 
complicated  by  the  delicate  duality  between 
cooperation  and  preservation  of  sovereignty. 
From now on, managing this duality in view of a 
reinforced  intergovernmental  CSDP  will 
especially be a challenge to High Representative 
Cathy Ashton and her EEAS. 
 
Col.  Johan  Andries,  Colonel  Pilot  Passed 
Staff  College  – H e a d  o f  t h e  D e f e n c e  T a s k  
Force 
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Endnotes 
1 ATALANTA’s mandate had to be extended before 12 
December 1 0 .  The  planned  Foreign  Affairs  Council 
(FAC) held on 13 December was no option in order to 
avoid a gap in the mandate. A small detail: the decision 
was  not  made  at  the  informal  FAC  in  MOD 
configuration on 9 December, but actually at the Ecofin 
Council on 7 December.! 
2 On 6 December 2010 the Ministers of Defence and of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  France,  Germany a n d  P o l a n d  
presented a “Weimar paper” to HR Ashton in which 
they offered points of interest and suggestions for the 
reinforcement of the CSDP. 
3 In September 2008 NATO Secretary General de Hoop 
Scheffer and UK Minister of Defence Brown organised 
an informal meeting for the NATO MODs in London 
in  order  to  reflect  on  transformation  following  the 
NATO  Summit  in  Bucharest.  This  meeting  is  still 
referred to as the “Armchair meeting” of London. 
4 Parallel to the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon 
there was growing awareness of the opportunity for a 
formal Security and Defence forum in which the MODs 
could  take  decisions  in  matters  that  belong  to  their 
exclusive competence. It is almost a matter of course 
that this brings us to the domain of military capability 
development. 
5 I n  N o v e m b e r  2 0 1 0  G e r m a n y  a n d  S w e d e n  i s s u e d  a  
joint  “Food  for  Thought”  paper  with  concrete 
proposals for methods on how to elaborate the “Ghent 
initiative”  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  i d e a s  o f  Minister  of 
Defence  zu  Guttenberg. 
In its Steering Board of 9 December 2010 the EDA was 
asked  (and  the  member  states  were  encouraged)  to 
further  investigate  and  propose  Pooling  &  Sharing 
opportunities. On 4 February 2011 the Chairman of the 
EU Military Committee sent a letter to the CHODs of 
the  EU  Member  States  in  which  he  inquired a b o u t  
views,  opportunities  and  proposals  concerning 
cooperation. 